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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                               
NO. 05-2554
                               
SABINO VALDES,
                Appellant
v.
UNION CITY BOARD OF EDUCATION
____________________________________
On Appeal From the United States District Court
For the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Civ. No. 01-cv-05660)
District Judge: Honorable John C. Lifland
_______________________________________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
July 21, 2006
Before: SLOVITER, SMITH AND VAN ANTWERPEN, CIRCUIT JUDGES
(Filed: July 24, 2006)
_______________________
OPINION
_______________________
PER CURIAM
Sabino Valdes appeals pro se from the order of the United States District Court for
the District of New Jersey granting the defendant’s motion for summary judgment in this
2action brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (“Title
VII”) and the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination, N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 et seq.
(“NJLAD”).
I.
Sabino Valdes was hired as a plumber by the Union City Board of Education (the
“Board”) in 1994.  In 1995, he became Coordinator of Plumbing Activities responsible
for purchasing materials and tools.  From 1994 through 1998, Valdes was considered a
stellar employee who received outstanding performance evaluations from his supervisor,
William Hogan.  But 1999 witnessed a downward spiral in relations between Valdes and
the Board precipitated by the Board’s decision not to hire Valdes as Director of Building
and Grounds and by its decision to discipline him for abuse of sick leave in April and
May 1999.
After he applied for the job of Director of Buildings and Grounds, Valdes took
twenty-eight sick days from April 5 to June 16, 1999.  Valdes spent some of the sick days
assisting Neftali Cruz in his campaign for election to local office, by picking Cruz up and
driving him around Union City.  The Board investigated the matter and in September
1999, it charged Valdes with abuse of sick leave.  On November 16, 1999, after
unsuccessful attempts to reach a settlement, the Board notified Valdes that his pay would
be docked five days for abuse of sick leave.
Meanwhile, in June 1999, the Board hired John Knudsen for the Building and
Grounds position.  Initially, Valdes appeared to work well under Mr. Knudsen.  But once 
1  Valdes could only return to light duty work for medical reasons unrelated to this
matter.
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he was disciplined for abuse of sick leave, Valdes started having problems with his new
supervisor.  Valdes alleged that from November 1999 until his temporary suspension on
April 3, 2000, Knudsen singled him out for discipline for improper dress at work, took his
computer, stripped him of some of the administrative responsibilities he had performed
for four years, followed Valdes to his work assignments, required him to report his
whereabouts by phone, verbally harassed him in front of other employees, assigned him a
vehicle that had no heat in the middle of winter, made him work during his lunch break,
and allowed at least two other employees to verbally harass him on account of his race
and ethnic origin.
Valdes received his first negative performance evaluation in March 2000.  On
April 3, 2000, the Board suspended Valdes with pay for abuse of sick leave.  In August
2000, the Board filed tenure charges against Valdes for unbecoming conduct,
insubordination, and excessive absenteeism, arising out of incidents beginning in 1999
and continuing through August 2000.  The Board proposed a settlement agreement that all
tenure charges be dropped and that Valdes be allowed to return to work.1  In October
2000, the Commissioner of Education rejected the Board’s proposal, but allowed Valdes
to continue working pending the tenure hearing.  In November 2000, during the pendency
of the tenure charges, Valdes applied unsuccessfully for the position of Director of
Custodial Services.  The Board hired a Caucasian male, Louis Fusco, to fill the position.
4Valdes filed a complaint with the EEOC and the New Jersey Department of Law
and Public Safety, Division of Civil Rights in October 2000.  The EEOC issued a right-
to-sue letter on September 13, 2001, a copy of which was sent to the Board.  On
December 5, 2001, Valdes filed a counseled employment discrimination complaint in
District Court.  On December 18, 2001, the Board amended its tenure charges, adding
numerous incidents of insubordination and unbecoming conduct that occurred in 2001. 
On January 10, 2002, Valdes was suspended with pay.  A twenty-five day hearing on the
tenure charges occurred from May through August 2002.  In May 2003, the
Administrative Law Judge recommended Valdes’s removal from his tenured position.  On
June 23, 2003, Valdes was terminated.  The State Board of Education affirmed the
Commissioner’s decision in August 2004.
In the Complaint he filed in District Court, Valdes claimed job discrimination on
account of his status as an African-American of Cuban descent and retaliation for filing
an EEOC complaint, in violation of Title VII and the NJLAD.  He sought backpay,
damages, and injunctive relief.  The Board filed a motion for summary judgment claiming
that Valdes failed to establish a prima facie case of race/ethnicity discrimination and that,
in any event, the Board terminated Valdes for legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons.  The
Board also claimed that issue preclusion applied based on the findings of the
Administrative Law Judge in the tenure proceedings.  Valdes countered that his
termination on the tenure charges was pretextual and that issue preclusion did not apply.
Upon consideration of the parties’ written submissions, the District Court granted
5summary judgment for the Board.  On the merits, the District Court held that (1) although
Valdes established a prima facie case with respect to the Board’s failure to promote him
to the Director of Building and Grounds position in 1999, he failed to show that the
Board’s reason for not to promoting him, namely his abuse of sick leave, was pretextual;
(2) Valdes failed to establish a prima facie case that the Board discriminated against him
on account of his race/ethnicity with respect to the position of Director of Custodial
Services because Valdes could not demonstrate that he was qualified for the job in light
of his excessive absences from work, negative performance evaluations, and the existence
of tenure charges against him; (3) there was no causal link between Valdes’s protected
EEOC activity and the alleged retaliatory actions because (a) the Board was not served
with a copy of the EEOC complaint until January 2002, well after it had amended the
tenure charges, and (b) the other adverse actions alleged by Valdes had occurred before
he filed an EEOC complaint; and (4) Valdes failed to make out a hostile work
environment claim.  The District Court also held that issue preclusion did not apply in
Valdes’s case.  On April 29, 2005, the District Court granted summary judgment in the
Board’s favor as to all claims.  Valdes timely appealed.
II.
We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and exercise plenary
review over an order granting summary judgment.  See Pub. Interest Research Group of
N.J., Inc. v. Powell Duffryn Terminals, Inc., 913 F.2d 64 (3d Cir. 1990).  Summary
judgment shall be granted when “no genuine issue [exists] as to any material fact and
6[when] the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(c).  We view the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and we draw
all inferences in that party’s favor.  See Reitz v. County of Bucks, 125 F.3d 139, 143 (3d
Cir. 1997).  We will affirm substantially for the reasons set forth by the District Court in
its opinion.
We agree with the District Court that summary judgment in the Board’s favor was
warranted with respect to Valdes’s Title VII claims concerning the Board’s failure to
promote him to the positions of Director of Building and Grounds and Director of
Custodial Services.  Assuming in Valdes’s favor that he made out a prima facie case of
employment discrimination in each instance, we turn to whether he could successfully
rebut the Board’s proffer of a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for each alleged
adverse employment action.  Proceeding under a “pretext” framework, a plaintiff who
establishes a prima facie case of discrimination must then demonstrate by a
preponderance of the evidence that the employer’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason
for taking an adverse employment action is merely pretextual, and that the true reason for
the adverse employment decision was discrimination.  See Iadimarco v. Runyon, 190
F.3d 151, 166 (3d Cir. 1999).  Here, the Board explained that it did not promote Valdes to
Director of Buildings and Grounds because of his abuse of sick leave in 1999 and that
Valdes did not get the Custodial Services job because of his misconduct and poor
performance evaluations in 2000.
Valdes was required to “point to some evidence, direct or circumstantial, from
7which a fact finder could reasonably either (1) disbelieve the employer’s articulated
legitimate reasons; or (2) believe that an invidious discriminatory reason was more likely
than not a motivating or determinative cause of the employer’s action.”  Fuentes v.
Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 764 (3d Cir. 1994).  This burden is met through a demonstration
that “weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the
employer’s proffered legitimate reason are such that a reasonable factfinder could
rationally find them ‘unworthy of credence.’” See id. at 765.
Valdes has not made this showing.  He attempts to demonstrate that the Board’s
reasons for deciding not to promote him were a pretext for race/ethnicity discrimination
by emphasizing that his negative performance evaluations and the decision not to promote
him, even though he was qualified, were wrong.  This Court has held that “it is not
enough for a plaintiff to show that the employer’s decision was wrong or mistaken,
because the issue is whether the employer acted with discriminatory animus.”  Abramson
v. William Paterson College of N.J., 260 F.3d 265, 283 (3d Cir. 2001).  Without some
other evidence that would call into question the credibility of his supervisors’ evaluation
of his work or the Board’s decision not to promote him, Valdes’s assertions do not
amount to a showing of pretext.  See Fuentes v. Parker, 32 F.3d 759, 766 (3d Cir. 1994).
Beyond his own opinion that the Board treated him wrongfully, unprofessionally,
and unfairly, Valdes offers no evidence to rebut the explanations the Board provided to
support its decisions with respect to Valdes’s promotion claims.  Valdes may disagree
with the wisdom, fairness, or correctness of the Board’s actions, but disagreement,
8without more, does not rebut the Board’s legitimate non-discriminatory reasons for its
actions.  Absent any evidence that would undermine the Board’s articulated reasons for
its decisions, Valdes cannot show discriminatory animus, and cannot avert summary
judgment on his Title VII claims.  As for Valdes’s race-based hostile work environment
claim, the District Court properly determined that Valdes failed to show that his work
environment was permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that was
severe or pervasive enough to alter the conditions of his employment.  See Faragher v.
City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998).
Valdes argues that the District Court did not afford him the opportunity to show
that the Board’s proffered non-discriminatory reasons for not promoting him were
pretextual.  There is nothing in this record that leads us to the conclusion that the District
Court decided summary judgment prematurely, without giving Valdes adequate time for
discovery or for responding to the Board’s summary judgment motion.
Valdes also claimed that the Board retaliated against him for filing EEOC charges
by amending the tenure charges in 2001, which led to his termination in 2003.  To make
out a retaliation claim under Title VII, a plaintiff must show that: (1) he engaged in a
protected employee activity; (2) the employer took an adverse employment action after or
contemporaneously with the protected activity; and (3) a causal link exists between the
protected activity and the employer’s adverse action.  See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).  If a plaintiff successfully establishes a prima facie case, the
burden then shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason
9for the adverse action.  Id.  Here, Valdes was engaged in protected activity when he
pursued EEOC charges in 2000.  See 42 U.S.C. § 2003-3a; see also Abramson v. William
Paterson College, 260 F.3d 265, 288 (3d Cir. 2001).  Valdes’s termination constitutes an
adverse action.  Therefore, the primary issue before us is whether Valdes can demonstrate
a causal link between his protected activity and the Board’s actions that eventually led to
his termination.
The causal link may be established by the “temporal proximity between the
protected activity and the termination” or by proof that the employer “engaged in a
pattern of antagonism in the intervening period.”  Woodson v. Scott Paper Co., 109 F.3d
913, 920-21 (3d Cir. 1997).  It may also be established from “other evidence gleaned
from the record as a whole from which causation can be inferred.”  Farrell v. Planters
Lifesavers Co., 206 F.3d 271, 281 (3d Cir. 2000).  Viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to Valdes, we find nothing in the record to support a finding of a causal
connection between the filing of the EEOC charges and his subsequent termination.  See
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986); Stewart v. Rutgers, The
State Univ., 120 F.3d 426, 431 (3d Cir. 1997).
Valdes alleged in his Complaint, that after he filed EEOC charges in 2000, his
supervisors subjected him to more stringent review and sought to induce his termination
by eliminating his job responsibilities and by treating routine daily interactions as
incidents of unprofessional conduct and insubordination.  However, it is undisputed that
Valdes was terminated based on continuing misconduct occurring before and after the
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EEOC complaint was filed.  The Board amended the tenure charges in December 2001,
more than a year after the filing of the EEOC Complaint.  See Cert. of Thomas Kobin,
Exhs. 23 & 24.  We agree with the District Court that the evidence failed to establish a
causal link between the protected activity and the alleged adverse employment action. 
See Aman v. Cort Furniture Rental Corp., 85 F.3d 1074, 1085 (3d Cir. 1996).
We have thoroughly reviewed Valdes’s remaining arguments on appeal and find
them to be meritless.
Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.  Valdes’s motion
to supplement the record is denied.  To the extent that Valdes seeks to submit documents
and transcripts that are not part of the District Court record, the motion is denied pursuant
to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 10(a).  As for the documents and transcripts that
are part of the District Court record, the Board’s motion to file a supplemental appendix
containing the District Court record, which Valdes did not oppose, was granted in March
2006, and thus, the documents and transcripts are already properly before this Court.
